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PLI (professional liability insurance) is currently the main method used to control construction practice risk and is an important
economic measure of construction industry governance. Few literatures have analyzed the sustainability of the liability insurance
market. In particular, the research on the sustainability of the PLI market in the construction industry is still blank. *e
sustainability of the market can be identified with the equilibrium of the system over a certain period of time. From the perspective
of cooperation benefits, this paper adopts evolutionary game theory (EGT) to analyze the evolutionary trends of stakeholders’
behaviors and their evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in the PLI market of the construction industry. A case study from the
history of the US PLI market evolution over nearly 100 years is taken to illustrate the stakeholder game and interpret the market
evolution path, and several typical stages of the development of the US PLI market are explored. Some factors that can cause a shift
in equilibrium are found. *e results show that the change in the legal environment will directly affect the payoffs of the
stakeholders, cause market imbalance, and trigger crisis. *ese findings will help out the government to regulate the market in a
timely manner by improving external factors, such as by building a sound credit system and ensuring the stability of the legal
system. In an equilibrium state, competitive markets can eliminate individuals with high accident rates and companies with high
operating costs. Moreover, these findings will also set a base for future researches to investigate the role of insurance market and
legal environment in depth while providing the intensive critical factors towards sustainable construction industry.
1. Introduction
*e responsibility risk management of architects, engineers,
builders, and other construction-related professionals, as
individuals who guarantee the healthy development of the
construction industry, concerns construction industry
personnel as well as the overall construction industry. With
the gradual deepening of industrial reform in some de-
veloping countries (for example, in China), the requirements
for construction professionals are increasingly strict [1]. In
addition, the externalities of construction projects are great,
as are the economic loss and the social impact when an
accident of practicing responsibility occurs. Heavy re-
sponsibility and high risk have become the main bottlenecks
restricting the technological innovation of construction
professionals. *is leads professionals to increase service
prices or to refuse to innovate in the face of the great risks.
*is situation is detrimental to the sustainability of con-
struction industry development. It is urgent to understand
the evolution of the PLI market, determine the influencing
factors of market equilibrium, and formulate feasible reg-
ulatory measures to ensure the sustainable development of
the construction industry. Similarly, the rapid increase in
construction defect litigation is causing many national and
regional insurers to limit their writings in residential con-
struction [2]. As a result, the current insurance market for
US construction professionals is one of the tightest markets
historically. *e surge in claims for construction defects, the
increase in the complexity of risk, and the absolute necessity
to control losses have become the three main forces driving
the changes in the US construction market. Understanding
these issues is essential to operating successfully in the
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construction arena, whether as an insurer, a professional, or
the government [3].
We proposed a novel perspective using evolutionary
game theory (EGT) to model stakeholders in the con-
struction industry’s professional liability insurance (PLI)
market and their payoff functions to seek equilibrium in
studying the development of the construction PLI market.
*is research aims to answer the following research
questions:
(1) In the competitive market, how does the construc-
tion industry PLI evolve?
(2) How do the strategic choices of the stakeholders
affect each other?
(3) What factors can cause a shift in equilibrium over
time?
(4) How can system (market) be sustainability over a
given period of time?
*e key outcome of this study is its provision of a
dynamic simulation environment for studying the in-
fluential factors contributing to the equilibrium of the
construction PLI market. *e balance of this paper proceeds
as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of previous
insurance market equilibrium research and the application
of EGT. Section 3 presents the methodology of the EGT
model by analyzing the influencing factors of each stake-
holder’s strategy selection and providing mathematical
proof and computational support of the equilibrium solu-
tion of the EGT model. Section 4 presents the model ver-
ification based on the US market, identifies the stages of
different market equilibrium states, and reveals the way
various influencing factors impact market equilibrium
through mathematical derivation and proofs. In Section 5,
two propositions of the study are discussed. At last, con-
clusions are given in Section 6 based on the discussion of the
EGT model.
2. Literature Review
Over the past decades, insurance and financial crises have
frequently occurred, which have had a great impact on the
social economy and have aroused the interest of the scientific
community [4]. PLI is different from life insurance, and its
market equilibrium directly affects the sustainability of the
development of the corresponding industry. *e sustain-
ability of the market can be identified with the equilibrium of
the system over a certain period of time. However, PLI
appears to have been studied less than the macroinsurance
market, and there is a gap in the research on the dynamic
equilibrium of the PLI market over a long period of time.
2.1. Equilibrium in the Insurance Market. Rothschild and
Stiglitz’s [5] adverse selection of the competitive insurance
market model is widely regarded as one of the most
important research results of the information asymmetry
common value market after Akerlof [6]. Much of the later
literature focused on the equilibrium of the insurance
market under the condition of information asymmetry. In
contrast to the single separating equilibrium in the classic
Rothschild–Stiglitz insurance market, multiple separating
equilibria are identified in many articles. Subsequent
studies solved the problem by considering a mixed
strategy [7], introducing an equilibrium concept different
from the Nash equilibrium [8, 9], extending the dynamic
structure of the game, introducing amendments to in-
surance company or contractual characteristics [10–13].
In addition, the existence of equilibrium from multiple
perspectives was discussed [14–17].
*e above literature lacks an explicitly dynamic model
that describes how insurers adjust their policies over time,
although many of the proposed equilibrium concepts are
motivated by dynamic interpretations. From the establish-
ment to the popularization of the PLI market, this multiyear
lag is difficult to model with traditional economic tech-
niques; although the history of the market is well known, no
comprehensive model has explained the behavior of the
stakeholders of the insurance market across time.*is paper
tries to provide an explicitly dynamic solution to the
equilibrium problem and thereby helps explain the phe-
nomenon that arises in the real insurance market and
present recommendations.
2.2. Application of EGT. *e economists Neumann and
Morgenstern first proposed the major formal account of
classical game theory [18]. Nash hinted at the later evolu-
tionary approach with his distinction between a “rational”
and “mass action interpretation” of the equilibrium solution
[19]. He assumed a population of players among which each
pure strategy is employed by the “average member” of the
appropriate population at a stable average frequency. EGT
was first formally developed by Lewontin in evolutionary
biology [20]. Subsequently, Maynard Smith defined and
developed the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) [21–23]. Axelrod’s use of game theory inspired many
social scientists [24], and Sugden imported the ESS concept
into economics [25]. Weibull argued that much of modern
EGT is in the spirit of Nash’s “mass action interpretation”
[26]. Since the early 1990s, there has been an explosion of
interest in evolutionary games among economists and social
scientists.
Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized po-
tential for modeling substantive economic issues [27]. *ey
promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but
often require more extensive specifications. Writing down a
system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) is a
classical way to mathematically represent a deterministic
dynamic process in continuous time [28]. *is approach is
also used in EGT, where the dynamic process in question
concerns the change over time in the distribution of be-
haviors (strategies) in a large population of interacting
individuals.
*e core idea of EGT is that in interactive situations,
strategy replication depends on the strategy performance in
the given population. Strategy performance, as in classical
game theory, is represented as payoffs assigned to all strategy
profiles. However, in contrast to classical game theory, EGT
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focuses not on the decisions of individual players but on the
properties of the whole population and on the effect of
properties of previous populations on the future population.
From the above literature review, traditional models that
have investigated stakeholder behavior have examined the
equilibrium problem of the insurance market by using
traditional game-theoretic approaches or by taking snap-
shots of stakeholders at specific points along a time horizon.
However, the historical changes in the market examined in
this paper represent one dynamic problem that evolved
slowly and sporadically across decades, and it is a contest in
which insurers and professionals had to learn and adapt as
they attempted to dominate in their interactions with peers
and each other.
EGT is a good method for studying PLI market equi-
librium changes on a long-term scale. EGT has the natural
advantage of dealing with cooperation or competition be-
tween two parties (players) and can effectively reflect the
complex relationships among multiple stakeholders, such as
professionals and insurers. *e different strategies adopted
by multiple stakeholders directly influence the equilibrium
of the PLI market. In addition, EGTcould be used to identify
the factors that influence the evolution of market
equilibrium.
3. Evolutionary Game Model Building
*e basic assumption is that the differential equation itself
does not change with time, and its practical significance is
that equations corresponding to the external environment
are constant. To compensate for this shortcoming and reflect
the interaction between the external policy environment and
the individual in the real economic system, in the fifth part of
this paper, we try to change the values of the parameters of
the game’s income function and observe the equilibrium
solution changes to reveal the way external factors influence
market equilibrium. *e basic assumptions of the model are
as follows.
In the implementation of personal practice insurance in
the construction industry, the professionals who are insured
and the insurance companies operating PLI essentially
comprise a group of professionals and insurance companies.
Under the rules set by the government, the strategy is
constantly adjusted and gradually evolving in repeated
games. A relatively poor strategy is replaced with a better
strategy to finally achieve a dynamic equilibrium. In this
equilibrium state, the professional may or may not be in-
sured, depending on the behavior of the insurer as well as the
relevant government policies.
3.1. Basic Assumptions
Hypothesis 1: the main participants are construction
industry-related professionals and insurance compa-
nies, and the government is the rule maker and reg-
ulator of the main game of the construction industry’s
individual practice insurance market. Although the
market rules formulated by the government are com-
mon knowledge for both parties, participants are not
able to fully acquire all the knowledge of the game
structure and rules. Even if all the information is ob-
tained, due to the differences in the knowledge and
cognitive abilities of the participants, there is no
guarantee that all participants will make rational de-
cisions. *is is one of the reasons for Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: both professionals and insurance com-
panies are subject to limited rationality and in-
formation asymmetry. *e bounded rationality of the
game player is restrained as follows: the game player
will not respond immediately according to the external
policy environment, which also conforms to the lagging
phenomenon of policies in the real economic system.
According to the myopic hypothesis, gamers are more
concerned with current interests than with future in-
terests when adjusting strategies.
Hypothesis 3: the probability that a professional group
chooses to insure is x, and the probability of not insuring
is 1− x. *e probability that an insurance company
chooses to underwrite is y, and the probability of
noninsurance is 1− y. x and y are the frequency vectors
of the strategy in the group, which can be understood as
the probability that the participants choose the corre-
sponding strategy or the ratio of the number of different
strategies to the total number of people.
3.2. Model and Parameter Description. *e strategy matrix
and payoff matrix of professionals and insurers have the
forms of Tables 1 and 2.
*e payment function is expressed as
A � p(h− q) + a− r, (1)
E � nr−mh−d, (2)
C � −pq− s, (3)
G � −b, (4)
B � −pq− a, (5)
F � −d, (6)
D � −pq, (7)
H � 0. (8)
*e meaning of each parameter is shown in Table 3.
3.3. Solution of Evolutionary Stability Strategy. *e expected
payoff function of both parties is constructed as follows:
Step 1. Expected payoff functions of professionals.
Insured professional’ expected payoffs:
EPRO(Y) � Ay + C(1−y). (9)
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Uninsured professionals’ expected payoffs:
EPRO(N) � By + D(1−y). (10)
Professionals’ expected payoffs:
EPRO � xEPRO(Y) + C(1−y). (11)
Step 2. Expected payoff functions of insurance companies.
Expected payoff function of the insurance companies
that choose to operate:
EINS(Y) � xE +(1−x)F. (12)
Expected payoff function of the insurance companies
that choose not to operate:
EINS(N) � xG +(1−x)H. (13)
Insurance companies’ expected earnings:
EINS � yEINS(Y) +(1−y)EINS(N). (14)
Table 1: Game strategy matrix.
Participants Insurance companies
Operated (y) Not operated (1− y)
Professionals Insured (x) Insured, operated Insured, not operatedNot insured (1− x) Not insured, operated Not insured, not operated
Table 2: Payoff matrix.
Participants Insurance companies
Operated (y) Not operated (1− y)
Professionals Insured (x) A, E C, GNot insured (1− x) B, F D, H
Table 3: Model parameter.
Parameter Description
r Professionals are required to pay premiums. *e premium level directly affects the enthusiasm of professionals forbecoming insured, and the insured professionals are the source of funds that allows insurance companies to form risk pools.
p
Professional liability accident probability. *e probability of professional liability accidents is related to the kind of
professional and individual practice level. It is one of the most important bases for calculating premiums and an important
indicator for the government to measure the overall industry risk and individual skill level. For the simplified analysis and
calculation, the p value is the industry average, and (0<p< 1), that is, all professionals who are insured and uninsured,
without considering influencing factors, such as moral hazard after obtaining insurance.
q
Expected loss of professional liability accident. *e economic losses caused by occupational liability accidents in the
construction industry often far exceed the fixed assets of technology-based enterprises. Once an accident occurs, the
enterprise may face bankruptcy, and the liability of professionals may not be implemented. For public engineering accidents
in particular, the impacts of social, political, and credit issues, etc., are important factors the government is extremely
concerned about.
a
Credit income generated by professionals after insurance.*is mainly includes the potential benefits in credit guarantees, as
well as the competitive advantages in the bidding process. *e size of credit benefits is related to the completeness of the
market credit system and the reward and punishment system formulated by the regulatory authorities.
s
Professionals are willing to become insured, but there is no suitable liability insurance product, and the result is
noninsurance risk control expenditure. Professionals will transfer the risk to the service price or choose to exit the market
directly to avoid the risk. In an environment with high overall risk prevention awareness, professionals will also be exposed
to various noninsurance risk control expenditures and indirect losses, such as limited business scope and low credit rating.
h
*e amount paid by the insurance company after the professional liability accident. After the accident, the effective
compensation amount of the insurance claims confirmed by both parties is usually less than the direct economic loss caused
by the accident. *erefore, this paper assumes that h< q.
n Number of professionals insured, as the more the people insured are, the larger the risk pool of the insurance company is,and the stronger the company’s ability to pay.
m Number of insured professionals who have experienced liability accidents within a certain time interval (such as one year),which directly affects the insurance company’s claims.
d PLI business underwriting start-up costs. *is part mainly includes start-up costs, such as publicity, inspection, anddevelopment, as well as late-stage underwriting costs.
b Opportunity cost incurred by insurance companies without PLI business.
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Step 3. Formulating a replicator dynamic system.
In a replicator dynamic system, the growth rate of a
strategy selected by the players should be equal to its
fitness less the average fitness of all players in the pop-
ulation [29].





� x EPRO(Y)−EPRO( 􏼁
� x(1− x)(y(A−C−B + D) + C−D)
� x(1− x)(y(ph + 2a + s− r)− s),
(15)
F′(x) � (1− 2x)(y(A−C−B + D) + C−D)
� (1− 2x)(y(ph + 2a + s− r)− s).
(16)





� y EINS(Y)−EINS( 􏼁
� y(1−y)(x(E−F−G + H) + F−H)
� y(1−y)(x(nr−mh + b)−d),
(17)
F′(y) � (1− 2y)(x(E−F−G + H) + F−H)
� (1− 2y)(x(nr−mh + b)− d).
(18)
*e evolution equilibrium of the construction industry
PLI market can be described by a first-order differential
equation set composed of equations (16) and (18) as
follows:
F′(x) � (1− 2x)(y(A−C−B + D) + C−D)
� (1− 2x)(y(ph + 2a + s− r)− s),
F′(y) � (1− 2y)(x(E−F−G + H) + F−H)










*e Jacobian matrix of the system is as follows:
J �
(1− 2x)(y(A−C−B + D) + C−D) x(1− x)(A−C−B + D)
y(1−y)(E−F−G + H) (1− 2y)(x(E−F−G + H) + F−H)
􏼢 􏼣. (20)
Weibull presented the mathematical proof of various
equilibrium solutions of the typical symmetric 2∗ 2 evolu-
tional game [30]. Sun established the dynamic equations of a
2× 2 asymmetric evolutionary game and topologically clas-
sified its qualitative properties to address the problem of
evolutionary stability [31]. Based on the above research results,
in this paper, there are 16 possible types of the original static
games presented in Table 1, depending on the payoff values of
each side of the game; however, we will focus primarily on four
types of representative situations in our analysis.
3.4. Existence of Equilibrium. As we have identified sus-
tainability with the long-term equilibrium of the con-
struction industry PLI market viewed as a dynamic system,
some propositions that guarantee the existence of one or
more stable points with technical proof are necessary.
*eorem:
(1) *e five fixed points, E1 (0, 0), E2 (0, 1), E3 (1, 1), E4
(1, 0), and E5 (X, Y), where X� (H− F)/(E− F−
G+H) and Y� (D−C)/(A−C−B+D), are equi-
librium conditions of the replicator dynamic system
(2) *e equilibrium point (0, 0) is the ESS, if A<B,
C<D, E<G, and F<H (State 1)
(3) *e equilibrium point (1, 1) is the ESS, if A>B,
C>D, E>G, and F>H (State 2)
(4) *e equilibrium points (1, 0) and (0, 1) are the ESS, if
A<B, C>D, E<G, and F>H (State 3)
(5) *e equilibrium points (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the ESS, if
A>B, C<D, E>G, and F<H (State 4)
Proof:
(1) According to the stability theorem of differential
equations, the equilibrium point of the replicator
dynamic system represented by equations (19) should
satisfy F′(x) � 0, F′(y) � 0, so E1 (0, 0), E2 (0, 1), E3
(1, 1), E4 (1, 0), and E5 (X, Y), where X� (H−F)/
(E−F−G+H) and Y� (D−C)/(A−C−B+D), are
equilibrium conditions of the replicator dynamic
system.
(2) According to the constraints given by *eorem 2,
it is known that the (no insurance and no business)
strategy has higher returns than other strategies
and is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium of
the original game in Table 2. *ere is no prisoner’s
dilemma game of potential cooperative interests in
the original game. *erefore, the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the infinite and finite repeated
games in this model is the Nash equilibrium of the
original game. In addition, the equilibrium sta-
bility of each point can be judged by the de-
terminant and trace of its Jacobian matrix J
(equation (20)). When A < B, C <D, E <G, F <H,
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Det(J) > 0, and Tr(J) < 0, E1 (0, 0) is the only ESS of
State 1.
(3) In the same way, when A>B, C>D, E>G, F>H
(State 2), Det(J)> 0, and Tr(J)< 0, it can be proved
that (insured, operated) E3 (1, 1) is the ESS of State 2.
(4) When A<B, C>D, E<G, and F>H (State 3), the
equilibrium points are E2 (0, 1), E4 (1, 0), Det(J)> 0,
and Tr(J)< 0, so E2 (0, 1) and E4 (1, 0) are both ESS.
(5) When A>B, C<D, E>G, and F<H (State 4), the
equilibrium points are E1 (0, 0), E3 (1, 1), Det(J)> 0,
and Tr(J)< 0, so E1 (0, 0) and E3 (1, 1) are both ESS.
*ere are five possible equilibrium points for the rep-
licator dynamic system: E1 (0, 0), E2 (0, 1), E3 (1, 1), E4 (1, 0),
and E5 (X, Y), where X� (H− F)/(E− F−G+H) and
Y� (D−C)/(A−C−B+D). Whether the equilibrium points
are the ESS depends on the relative size of the payoff
function (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H) value. Its numerical
relative size is determined by the value of each parameter in
Table 3; namely, the real economic system corresponding to
each parameter value determines the market equilibrium,
and the determinant and trace of each equilibrium point in
different states are shown in Table 4.
4. Model Verification Based on the US Market
Taking the development of the US PLI market as an example,
the initial market state is (not insured, not operated), and the
state gradually develops into (insured, operated). In the
period of rapid development, full insurance coverage of all
professionals is not reached, and all insurance companies are
underwriting, which is the perfect state but is affected by
various internal and external factors in a dynamic process.
During insurance crisis, the availability crisis and afford-
ability crisis have great research value. In a market expe-
riencing availability crisis, many insurance companies are
bankrupt, and professionals cannot purchase liability in-
surance. In a market experiencing affordability crisis, there
are insurance products on the market, but premiums are too
expensive for professionals to afford [32]. *e essence of the
crisis is the abnormal evolution of the game strategy and the
market imbalance. *erefore, in this paper, we select four
representative states of the US construction industry PLI
market development for analysis, as shown in Figure 1.
A PLI for architects existed in the US since as early as
1950 [33]. Despite over half a century of development, the
US construction PLI market remains in constant reflection,
reform, and development after undergoing start-up growth,
profit, and crisis. Many scholars have conducted in-depth
research on the market’s development, and their results have
contributed valuable insights. *is paper mainly takes the
relatively mature American PLI market as the object, sys-
tematically traces its market development trajectory, and
provides reasonable suggestions for the balanced develop-
ment of the PLI market in the construction industry.
4.1. Stage 1: Early Market. *e period before 1950 can be
regarded as the development stage of the basic theory of PLI
in the construction industry. *e literature on PLI for the
construction industry at this time was rare and mainly in-
cluded works by doctors, lawyers, accountants, and PLI
companies. Most of the theoretical research at this stage was
published in journals of law and economy, which shows that
the establishment of the liability insurance market must be
accompanied by a complete economic and legal system.
*e literature mainly focuses on professional liability risk
classification, economic principles, types of insurance, and
other basic theories [34]. *e function and significance of
insurance are expounded from social value, ethics, and
morality [35]. Mulligan provided a large number of real cases
and systematically expounded on the specific legal issues in
the practice and operation of insurance [36]. Concerning the
problems of prevention of various injury accidents and
compensation for victims’ loss caused by industrial expan-
sion, James proposed that the development of liability in-
surance can solve the above problems and analyzed the legal
problems caused by the implementation of the liability in-
surance system. He expressed doubts about the accident
prevention effect of liability insurance and presented specific
improvement measures [37]. He also explained the specific
terms of the liability insurance contract from a legal per-
spective based on a real liability insurance judgment case [38].
Specifically concerning PLI, at a special committee
meeting in 1924, the New York Medical Association issued a
recommendation for doctors engaged in radiation diagnosis
and treatment to take precautionary measures, disclaimers,
insurance transfer, and other risk control measures to
prevent medical liability accidents [39]. At that time, the
importance of adequate PLI coverage became increasingly
obvious to physicians, which led to the rapid and progressive
increase in premiums for such insurance since World War
II. *ese problems, together with the growing complexity of
the field and the increasing number of claims, settlements,
and judgments, make it mandatory for the physician to
know whether he is adequately protected. In response to this
problem, Joseph proposed very specific and detailed mea-
sures in terms of underwriting significance, insurer selec-
tion, type of underwriting, scope of coverage, disclaimer, and
withdrawal clauses [40]. At the same time, judges, legislators,
and other judicial personnel reached a consensus on the
unique nature of insurance contracts and the public service
role of the insurance industry. Insurance was believed to
have externalized and standardized many cumbersome
technologies and could be better used as a fair and effective
way to allocate the losses of various types of liability acci-
dents. *e risk management function of insurance was
particularly emphasized in the hope that liability insurance
will develop into a more applicable social governance tool
[41]. Relyea noted that the legal proceedings against mu-
nicipal engineering companies undertaking government
public work construction projects could avoid the legal blind
area at that time by purchasing liability insurance [42].
4.1.1. State 1: Initial State of the Market. In the market, the
professional is not insured, the insurer is not operating (not
insured, not operated) is the only pure strategy Nash
6 Advances in Civil Engineering
equilibrium solution, and the corresponding profit value
constraint is A<B, C<D, E<G, and F<H.
4.2. Stage 2:Market Expansion. *e time span of this stage is
from 1950 to 1970. It can be regarded as the growth period of
the development of the PLI market in the construction
industry. Since the 1960s, the US construction industry PLI
market has expanded rapidly. It first appeared for architects
beginning in 1950, and by 1970, PLI had extended to ba-
sically all types and scope in the US construction industry.
However, the lack of systematic planning and the blind
and reckless expansion of PLI also laid a hidden danger that
would lead to the outbreak of insurance crisis.
4.2.1. State 2: Period of Rapid Development. *e market
expands rapidly. A large number of professionals participate
in insurance, insurance companies develop new types of PLI,
the market trend (insured, operated) growing rapidly (in-
sured, operated) is the only pure strategy Nash equilibrium
and the corresponding profit value constraints are A>B,
C>D, E>G, and F>H.
4.3. Stage 3: Insurance Crisis. At this stage, the research
results concerning basic theories are very rich. *is paper
focuses on the literature on the crisis of the liability in-
surance market and analyzes the main causes of market
imbalance.
Since the 1970s, there have been three major liability
insurance crises in the US. *e PLI crisis that broke out in
the 1970s and 1980s has the widest range, involving medical,
nursing, municipal, law, accounting, civil aviation, and other
industries. *e crisis that broke out in early 2000 mainly
focused on the medical liability insurance field [43]. *e
construction industry was not immune to these two crises;
the great impact of the collapse of insurance companies
undertaking construction-related liability insurance, the rise
of PLI premiums, the sharp reduction of construction in-
dustry profits, and the loss of construction talents remains to
the present [44]. After the outbreak of the second liability
insurance crisis in the US in the 1980s, the government sets
up a special investigation team to comprehensively in-
vestigate and analyze the liability insurance crisis, believing
that the development of tort law was the main cause [32].
Tort law impacts the insurance market mainly in that the
development of no-fault liability will expand the scope of
tort liability indefinitely while protecting the interests of
victims [45]. Manymore companies and individuals who are
not directly responsible for the fault are made responsible for
the loss of the victim [46]. *e reason for the outbreak of the
liability insurance crisis cannot be explained by only one
theory or principle, but there is consensus that the expansion
of tort liability range is an important cause. Many studies
have explained the mechanism of action between tort law
and liability insurance crisis [47–51]; While the construc-
tion-related professional liability used to be limited to
damage caused by negligence during construction practice,
the change of the tort liability law extended the responsibility
of the engineer to aspects such as construction site safety,
third-party damage, and product liability. *ese aspects are
clearly beyond the scope of professional responsibility and
represent a great challenge for construction industry pro-
fessionals [52]. In addition, with the misinterpretation of the
Table 4: Determinant Det(J) and trace Tr(J) of the equilibrium point under various state conditions.
Balance Determinant Det(J) State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4Trace Tr(J)
E1 (0, 0) (C−D) (F−H) + ESS + Unstable + Unstable + ESSC−D+ F−H − + + −
E2 (0, 1) (A−B) (H− F) − Unstable − Unstable + ESS + UnstableA−B+H− F ∗ ∗ − +
E3 (1, 1) (B−A) (G−E) + Unstable + ESS + Unstable + ESSB−A+G−E + − + −
E4 (1, 0) (D−C) (E−G) − Unstable − Unstable + ESS + UnstableD−C+E−G − ∗ − +
E5 (X, Y)
(H−F)(E−G)(C−D)(A−B)/(E−F−G +
H)(A−C−B + D) ∗ Unstable ∗ Unstable + Saddle point + Saddle point
0 0 0 0 0
∗Uncertainty; when Det(J)> and Tr(J)< 0, this point is ESS; (3) when Det(J)> and Tr(J)� 0, this point is the saddle point.
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Early market Quickly growing  Steady development Crisis outbreak
Figure 1: Market development trajectory.
Advances in Civil Engineering 7
causation of fault liability, the legal atmosphere is in-
creasingly inclined towards the victims of professional ac-
cidents, and the poor operation of the insurance industry is
another important cause of the crisis [51, 53–55].
Of course, the reasons for the outbreak of the crisis
cannot be attributed solely to external factors. *e US
construction industry also has many problems in terms of
risk management and control. For example, the application
of new materials that has not fully been demonstrated and
tested increases the probability of potential victims and a tort
damage lawsuit. *e increasingly complex modern con-
struction technology has increased the difficulty of identi-
fying tort liability and invisibly increased the operating cost
of the tort liability system. Nevertheless, the construction
industry has followed the traditional risk prevention and
control measures of professional responsibility and failed to
adapt quickly to the development of tort law.*e limitations
of the relevant professionals’ engineering thinking, coupled
with the lack of legal literacy, place such professionals at a
disadvantage when facing the potential threat of litigation
[33].
4.3.1. State 3: During the Crisis Shock. After rapid growth,
internal and external conditions change, the negative effects
of the high-speed growth begin to emerge, the market goes
into shock, and availability and affordability crises arise;
namely, (insured, not operated) and (not insured, operated)
are the equilibrium strategies and corresponding profit
constraint conditions for A<B, C>D, E<G, and F>H.
4.4. Stage 4: Steady Development. Since 1990 and after the
two PLI crises, the construction industry continued to re-
flect. During this period, much literature concerned the
specific issues of the types, scope, prevention, and control of
the occupational liability risks in the construction industry
and provided rich theoretical guidance for the healthy and
balanced development of the insurance market. Since 2000,
the medical PLI market has been the main market, and a
third crisis has broken out. During this crisis, the con-
struction industry PLI market has relatively been stable and
shown good capability of risk prevention and control, and
the theoretical achievements during this period are worth
learning from.
After the crises, the construction industry PLI market
enters the consolidation adjustment period, and the premium
price generally rises. *e questions whether the professional
personnel of the relevant construction industry should buy
PLI and how to decide become a general problem in the
construction industry. Rubin gave some very practical advice
[55]. Many studies have conducted research on the scope of
the professional responsibilities of various construction in-
dustry professionals, such as architects and structural engi-
neers, as well as on the division of responsibility among
relevant parties of a project and specific measures for risk
prevention and control [56–59]. Day [46] and Caine and
Tomas [60] analyzed the judgment standard of professional
liability negligence, and High and Rossler noted that the US
construction industry has experienced the phenomenon of
employees moving to small companies or individual firms. In
the past, litigation against a company has also turned to a large
number of individuals, and the best response is to strengthen
the knowledge and education of risk prevention and control
and improve the legal awareness of employees [61]. After the
crisis period, the proportions of organizational forms of PLI
companies also changed. During the crisis, a large number of
joint-stock companies went bankrupt, and various mutual
insurance companies with industry association backgrounds
entered the market. *e cost advantage of mutual insurance
companies allowed them to rapidly expand their business. At
the end of the crisis, the proportion of mutual insurance
companies in the PLI market rose sharply, reflecting a strong
risk tolerance [48, 54].
In this stage of the construction industry, the importance
of strengthening the industry’s own professional liability risk
control ability was realized. *e coverage of external factors
was narrowed, and insurance premiums rose, but by opti-
mizing the terms of the contract, the parties’ responsibilities
were limited, communication and coordination were
strengthened, risk prevention and control through measures
such as education were implemented, and the professional
liability accident probability was reduced. At the same time,
states in the US implemented tort law reform in response to
the liability insurance crisis, adopted reform measures such
as limiting noneconomic loss claims, strengthening in-
surance regulation, and optimizing the legal environment
and to some extent promoted the balanced development of
the PLI market in the construction industry [49, 62–64].
4.4.1. State 4: Consolidation Period. In the aftermath of the
crisis, the government reforms the game by reviewing de-
cisions, and the market enters the adjustment period. At this
point, some of the professionals in the market choose to be
insured, and others choose not to be; a certain proportion of
insurers likewise choose to operate, and others choose not to;
the corresponding profit constraint conditions are A>B,
C<D, E>G, and F<H.
4.5. Results of the Numerical Simulation. According to the
initial conditions of each state, MATLAB is used to simulate
the phase diagram of the strategy evolution, as shown in
Figures 2(a)–2(d). *e simulated strategy evolution path is
consistent with the strategy evolution path of both parties in
the US construction industry PLI market.
5. Discussion
By substituting and analyzing the factors that affect the
payoff function, the following results can be drawn.
5.1. Proposition 1. When the premium expenditure of the
professional purchasing PLI (r) is greater than the sum of the
expected compensation income (ph) and the incremental credit
income (2a), the sum of the cost of the PLI and the com-
pensation expense (d+mh) is greater than the sum of the
premium income and the opportunity cost of not being insured
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(nr+ b); simultaneously, the risk control expenditure cost of the
uninsured professional and the insurance party’s liability in-
surance operating cost are abnormal (d< 0 and s<0), and
(insured, not operated) and (not insured, operated) are ESSs.
At this time, the market will present an imbalance between
supply and demand, and there is great possibility of crisis.
Proof. A<B can be obtained from formulas (1) and (5),
when r> ph+ 2a; E<G can be obtained from formulas (2)
and (4), when d+mh> nr+ b; and C>D and F>H from
formulas (3) and (6)–(8), when s< 0, d< 0. At this time,
Det(J)> 0 and Tr(J)< 0 are present at the equilibrium points
of E2 and E4. erefore, under the constraint conditions in
conclusion 1, E2 (not insured, operated) and E4 (insured,
not operated), are the ESSs, and conclusion 2 is proven.
Discussion. In the early stage of market development, the
payos of the strategy (not insured, not operated) are greater
than those of other strategies, so the only pure strategy Nash
equilibrium solution of state 1 (not insured, not operated) is
a dominant strategy (Figure 2(a)). However, during the
evolution from State 1 (Figure 2(a)) to State 2 (Figure 2(b)),
the noninsurance risk control expenditure cost of the
professional changes from s> 0 to s< 0, and the insurer’s
operating cost changes from d> 0 to d< 0. In the real
economic system, the minimum value of the noninsurance
risk control expenditure of the professional should be 0, and
the minimum operating cost of the insurance company
should be 0. e practical signicance of the abnormal
change in these two parameters is that the professional
insurance demand at State 2 (Figure 2(b)) is satised, and
furthermore, additional income can be obtained from the
risk transfer; the average cost of the insurance company is
negative; that is, the industry as a whole is generally prof-
itable. As long as an insurance company enters the market, it
will have prot. is is consistent with the economic bubble
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Figure 2: Evolution phase diagram of States (a) 1, (b) 2, (c) 3, and (d) 4.
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that occurs during the rapid development of the industry.
After the market enters State 2 (Figure 2(b)), if the gov-
ernment does not intervene in these two parameters and the
market develops freely, the persistent anomaly will cause
State 2 (Figure 2(b)) to evolve into State 3 (Figure 2(c)) and
finally enter the crisis phase.
In State 3 (Figure 2(c)), the uncertainty of decision-
making between the two parties increases significantly.
Compared with State 2 (Figure 2(b)), the two parameters of
professionals’ noninsurance risk control expenditure cost and
insurance companies’ operating cost are still abnormal, but
the two players’ cooperation strategy (insured, operated) is
degraded to an unsteady state. *e payoff values show that it
is not an absolute dominant strategy for the insurers to choose
to operate in State 3 (Figure 2(c)). *is is reflected in the real
market; that is, an insurance company with excessive oper-
ating cost will opt out or go bankrupt, and some insurance
companies will make up for the loss of income by raising
premiums. Although this is in line with the market-led
governance principle, if the market develops freely, the scope
of the crisis will inevitably expand. *e direct impact on
market performance is the drastic reduction of the number of
insurance companies that operate the PLI business, which
leaves a small number of insurance companies that continue
to operate, greatly increased premiums, and professionals
who cannot afford the high premiums, which in turn leads to
availability and affordability crises.
5.2. Proposition 2. Under the condition that the endogenous
variables of the insurance market remain unchanged, the
adjustment of credit income (a) and opportunity cost (b) can
promote the balanced development of both parties, leading
to cooperation and a win-win situation. In the case of a
constant policy environment, the insurance company’s
underwriting cost d, the probability of risk p, the premium r,
and the accident probability p are the main factors that
restrict the cooperation between the two parties.
Proof. from equations (11) and (15), the professionals’
expected payoffs are F(EPRO) � x(1−x)(y(ph + 2a+
s− r)− s), assuming that the endogenous variables of the
two are unchanged. By deriving the benefit variable a,
F′(a) � 2(xy−x2y) can be obtained, and because
0< x< 1, 0<y< 1, 2(xy−x2y)> 0, F(a) is an increasing
function. Namely, keeping the other endogenous variables
constant, increasing credit income (a) can encourage pro-
fessionals to choose the cooperation strategy and become
insured; from formulas (14) and (17), the insurance com-
pany expects the return of income F(EINS)� y
(1− y)(x(nr−mh+ b)− d). In the same way, taking the op-
portunity cost b as an independent variable and deriving it,
F′(b)� xy− xy2 because 0< x< 1, 0< y< 1, and xy− xy2> 0,
so F(b) is the speed increase, that is, the opportunity cost b
increases, which can impact the company’s cooperation
strategy. *e same method can prove exogenous in the
policy environment. Under certain variable conditions, the
insurance company’s underwriting cost d, the probability of
risk p, and the premiums r and accident probability p paid by
professionals are the main factors restricting the cooperation
between the two parties. *is situation will not be repeated
here.
Discussion. *e evolution the phase diagram of State 4 in
Figure 2(d), the meaning of mapping to the real market
environment, shows that the dotted area S1 (Figure 2(d))
encloses E1, E2, E5, and E4, and the evolution of the two
sides will eventually degenerate to the state (not insured, not
operated). In contrast, in solid line area S2 (Figure 2(d)), the
strategic evolution of both parties will eventually tend to the
(insured, operate) cooperation strategy, which is the optimal
situation for cooperation and mutual benefit. *e pro-
portional distribution of the two strategies depends on the
specific position of the saddle point (X, Y) value, and the
market equilibrium state can be regulated by adjusting the
factor value that affects the saddle point.
During the evolution from State 3 (Figure 2(c)) to State
4 (Figure 2(d)), the US government adopted various policy
measures to resolve the insurance crisis. For example, the
establishment of the maximum limit of infringement
compensation and the optimization of the legal environ-
ment are reflected in the model, which influences the
exogenous variables. *e benefits to all parties will correct
the evolution paths of all parties and avoid further ex-
pansion of the market imbalance. For example, in terms of
credit benefits, after the Second World War, the US began
to build a credit information system. *e importance of
credit ratings has become deeply rooted; the credit ratings
of individuals and enterprises directly affect their lives and
various business activities. Its importance is also consistent
with the results of theoretical analysis. At the same time,
the accident probability or risk probability p can be ob-
served from the model analysis. Because this endogenous
variable is shared by both parties in the market, the
probability of accident occurrence p is reduced, with
positive effects on the return value of cooperative decision-
making (insured, operated). Both parties to the insurance
have a common interest. *e insurer can use various
economic means to motivate professionals to reduce the
probability of occupational liability accidents, thereby
realizing the market governance function of insurance.
Moreover, in the second part of the literature review, we
found that the US government did not directly intervene in
endogenous variables, such as underwriting costs and
premiums, nor did it mandate that professionals must
purchase PLI, more often through the insurance market.
*is reflects the survival of the fittest by adjustment and
contributes to the high degree of marketization of the US
PLI competition.
Here, the exogenous variable credit income a, opportunity
cost b, and two policy variables are selected for simulation
analysis, and Proposition 2 analysis results are verified.
Keeping other parameters constant, increasing the values of a
and b, and iterating 50 times (Figures 3(a) and 3(b)), the effect
of external factors on the strategy evolution of both parties can
be obtained. *e convergence speed of cooperation between
professionals and insurers is accelerated.When a� 6 and b� 5,
only 5 repeated games are required, and both sides choose the
cooperation strategy.
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6. Conclusions
*e results of the EGT model are consistent with the
findings in the case study of the historical development of
the US construction PLI market. An ESS of cooperation
for stakeholders influenced by many internal and external
factors, especially change in the legal environment, will
directly affect the payoffs of the stakeholders, cause
market imbalance, and trigger crisis; therefore, main-
taining the stability of the legal system is crucial to the
stability of the liability insurance market. In addition,
individual stakeholder factors, such as the frequency of
occupational liability accidents, operating costs, and in-
surance premiums, will influence the evolution of market
equilibrium.
In the market, stakeholders have different evolutionary
stability strategies in different external environments. *e
corresponding market shows equilibrium or crisis states,
and the system changes from one phase to another. *e
phase diagram of the changes throughout the four stages in
Figures 2(a)–2(d) shows that the phase corresponding to
the crisis state (Figure 2(c)) may be catastrophic for the
insurance market, and a relatively chaotic crisis status must
be avoided. A clear strategy to prevent entry into the crisis
state concerns government action: when the market is
overheated and some factors are abnormal, the government
should promptly intervene and reset the parameters. *e
best practice of this intervention is reform and innovation,
potentially by government institutional reforms, and in-
cludes technological innovation by professionals and in-
surers. *erefore, it is necessary for the government to
regulate the market in a timely manner by innovations,
such as building a sound credit system and ensuring the
stability of the legal system.
When the market is in a stable equilibrium state
(Figure 2(d)), professionals with excessive accident proba-
bility and insurers with excessive operating costs will be
eliminated by the market. A good institutional environment,
timely reform of the government, and technological and
management innovations of professionals and insurers are
the main measures to promote the sustainable and healthy
development of the liability insurance market.
*e civil engineer and other professionals are nowadays
exposed to floodgates of “liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class.” Professional liability insurance is perhaps the ultimate
option to which a civil engineer may resort to protect
himself, his firm, and his clients against hazards that might
eventuate as a result of errors, omissions, or breaches of
professional duty. Furthermore, from a technological in-
novation aspect, the only way in which professional men can
safeguard themselves against ruinous liability from high-risk
technological innovation is also by insurance.
*e contributions of this study are two-fold; practical
and theoretical. *e findings will lead the way for the
government to formulate strategies for regulating the market
through effective credit system while ensuring the stability of
the legal system. In addition, the findings will also be ef-
fective in an equilibrium state where competitive markets
can eliminate individuals with high accident rates and
companies with high operating costs. Moreover, the findings
of this study will also provide insights into future researches
to investigate the role of the insurance market and legal
environment while providing an effective environment to-
wards the sustainable construction industry.
*is article has certain limitations. For example, this
article only analyzes the evolution of the macroinsurance
market and does not propose specific methods for individual
professionals. Moreover, this article clearly explains the
interaction between the construction industry, insurance,
and law. Future research will focus more on the specific
methods of individual professional responsibility risk con-
trol, and how is the risk of occupational liability divided
among the respective professionals in the project. Moreover,
due to the limitations of the length of the article, the role of
occupational liability insurance in promoting technological
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innovation in the civil engineering industry is not explained
toomuch. Future research may also explore the link between
occupational liability and technical innovation in the civil
engineering industry.
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